Economic self-determination in post-conflict reconstruction: The case study of Timor-Leste by Mardikian, L
9
Introduction
The aim of  the chapter is to explore the role of  international law in economic 
reconstruction and, in particular, the right to economic self-determination as the 
right of  the people to choose their economic system. In international legal schol-
arship the issue of  economic reconstruction has been analysed more closely in 
respect of  the measures that were applied in Iraq and the extent to which the 
transformation of  a socially based economy to an open market was compatible 
with the laws of  occupation.1 Nevertheless, there remains certain ambivalence in 
identifying the rules related to economic transition and their interaction with the 
wider fabric of  international law beyond the scope of  occupation. After briefly 
considering the meaning of  economic self-determination in international soci-
ety during the period of  decolonisation, the chapter explains how post-conflict 
reforms can have an impact on our understanding of  the right and its param-
eters. Finally, it considers the case study of  Timor-Leste and how the right of  the 
Timorese people to economic self-determination was applicable in the reconstruc-
tion process.
Economic self-determination and post-conflict 
reconstruction
The legal right to economic self-determination became central to the process of  
decolonisation. It was considered a corollary to political independence and socio-
economic development of  the colonised states. 2 Indeed, the right emerged in 
the context of  negotiations between developed and newly independent states in 
the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) as the latter attempted to break 
 1 See G H Fox, ‘The Occupation of  Iraq’, (2004) 36 Georgetown Journal of  International Law 195; 
B Crocker, ‘Restructuring Iraq’s Economy’ (2004) 27 The Washington Quarterly 73; A K Audi, ‘Iraq’s 
New Investment Laws and the Standard of  Civilisation: A Case Study of  the Limits of  Interna-
tional Law’ (2004) 93 Georgetown Law Journal 335.
 2 See UN Charter Arts 1(2) and 55; International Covenants of  Human Rights 1966 Art 1; A 
Cassese, Self-determination of  Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal (CUP 1995) 42–43.
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the economic arrangements that were forced upon them by colonialism.3 Resolu-
tions 1803 (1962)4 and 3201 (1970) defined two important pillars of  the right to 
economic self-determination: the free disposal of  natural resources and the right 
of  states to expropriate or nationalise foreign property.5 The central issue at that 
time was whether economic self-determination entitled states to expropriate for-
eign property without the provision of  full compensation.
On the one hand, customary international law at that time was summarized in 
the Hull formula, which required that expropriation was lawful if  it was carried 
out for a public purpose, in accordance with the law and followed by prompt, 
adequate and effective compensation.6 On the other hand, decolonised states 
interpreted economic self-determination as the entitlement to terminate the legal 
contracts with foreign investors, irrespective of  their obligations under interna-
tional law, and subject to the laws of  the host state.7
It is generally accepted that the UNGA resolutions did not reform customary 
international law on matters of  expropriation.8 Evidence of  this is found in the 
rules of  international economic law, which regulate the standards of  treatment 
of  foreign investors through Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and multilateral 
agreements. They require in their majority that the host state provides prompt, 
adequate and effective compensation in the event of  expropriation illustrating 
that the Hull formula remains customary international law.9 Instead, the GA 
resolutions can be regarded as crystallising the relationship between the right to 
economic self-determination and permanent sovereignty over natural resources, 
which is readily considered to apply beyond the context of  decolonisation.10
 3 R Dolzer, ‘Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources and Economic Decolonisation’ (1986) 
7 Human Rights Law Journal 217.
 4 UNGA, ‘Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources’ (1960) UN Doc A/RES/1803.
 5 UNGA, ‘Declaration on the Establishment of  a New International Economic Order’ (1974) A/
RES/S-6/3201 para 4.
 6 This was confirmed by the decisions of  arbitration tribunals, national and international courts in 
the nineteenth and at the beginning of  the twentieth centuries. See Norwegian Ship-owners Claims (Nor-
way v USA), PtC of  Arbitration 1922; Factory at Chorzow (Germ v Pol), 1926 PtC of  Arbitration (Ser A) 
No 7 (May 1925); see R Dolzer, ‘New Foundations of  the Law of  Expropriation of  Alien Property’ 
(1981) 71 American Journal of  International Law 553 at 558; S M Schwebel, ‘Investor-State Disputes 
and the Development of  International Law’ (2004) American Society of  International Law Proceedings 27. 
 7 M Bedjaoui, Towards a New International Economic Order (Holmes and Meier Publishers 1979); N Schri-
jver, Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources (CUP 1997).
 8 See TOPCO/CALASTIC Award, IRAN-US CTR, 19 January 1977, published in English transla-
tion in 53 International Law Reports, para 62; P M Norton, ‘A Law of  the Future or a Law of  the 
Past? Modern Tribunals and the International Law of  Expropriation’ (1991) 85 American Journal of  
International Law 474; U Kriebaum and A Reinisch, ‘Property, Right to, International Protection’, 
in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), Max Planck Encyclopedia of  PIL (OUP 2010); <www.mpepil.com> accessed 
25 March 2014.
 9 OECD, ‘Indirect expropriation’ and the ‘Right to Regulate’ in International Investment Law, 
Working Papers on International Investment 2004/04 (2004) 2; <http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/
internationalinvestmentagreements/33776546.pdf> accessed 30 March 2014.
10 A Farmer, ‘Towards a Meaningful Rebirth of  Economic Self-determination: Human Rights Reali-
sation in Resource-rich Countries’ (2006) 39 International Law and Politics 417; Schrijver (n 7); see 
8328-0003-PII-009.indd   187 2/4/2015   5:37:34 PM
188 Lisa Mardikian
Post-conflict reconstruction offers a different context from decolonisation. In 
the aftermath of  the conflict, the absence of  effective governing authorities hin-
ders the exercise of  the right of  the people to determine their economic organ-
isation due to the lack of  representative authorities and mechanisms to express 
their wishes. International engagement is therefore necessary both to facilitate 
the transition to sustainable peace and to ensure that the domestic authorities 
comply with their international obligations related to the internal governance of  
the territory.
Consequently, the reform processes affect domestic governance and impor-
tant economic choices are made, such as which industries are privatised, how 
the tax system is restructured, how property rights and commercial transactions 
are secured and which investment restrictions are lawful. It is not always clear, 
however, the degree to which international actors are permitted to influence the 
economic reforms without restricting the right of  the local actors to economic 
self-determination. An examination of  economic self-determination requires first, 
ascertaining how the right applies to post-conflict situations: Do the consistent 
international policies in favour of  implementing market reforms affect our under-
standing of  the right?11 Is the post-conflict state constrained by international rules 
to implement certain economic measures? Does international law require the 
reconstruction of  a particular economic system, which entails the outcome of  an 
open market? Some further observations regarding the scope of  the right in the 
international society and the international community in the following section can 
be helpful.
The traditional law on economic self-determination
The traditional law on the right to economic self-determination pertains to the 
nature of  the international society. The international society is the aggregate of  
its sovereign member states, which are organised within their territorial boundar-
ies and coexist side by side.12 In their internal composition, states have distinct 
identities, which are shaped through their history and domestic affairs. Territorial 
separation and national distinctiveness therefore construct the pluralist nature of  
the international society based on thin socio-political affiliations amongst its mem-
ber states. Nevertheless, common concerns on matters of  security and stability can 
help to explain the need to regulate state relations and establish international insti-
tutions. The role of  international law is then to ‘shield the domestic cosmos from 
A Carty, ‘From the Right to Economic Self-determination to the Rights to Development: A Crisis 
in Legal Theory’ (1984) Third World Legal Studies 73; J Oloka-Onyango, ‘Heretical Reflections on 
the Right to Self- Determination: Prospects and Problems for a Democratic Global Future in the 
New Millennium’ (1999) American University International Law Review 151.
11 See M Melandri, ‘Self-determination and State-building in International Law: The Need for a 
New Research Approach’ (2014) Journal of  Conflict Security Law (first published online 29 May 2014); 
<http://jcsl.oxfordjournals.org/citmgr?gca=jconsl%3Bkru009v1> accessed 10 July 2014.
12 H Mosler, The International Society as a Legal Community (Sijthoff  1980) 2. 
8328-0003-PII-009.indd   188 2/4/2015   5:37:34 PM
Economic self-determination in post-conflict reconstruction 189
external interference and to encourage modes of  conduct based on consent’.13 
Law provides the mechanisms whereby states can agree on equal rights and their 
reciprocal obligations by preserving the demarcation of  the national sphere from 
the international. Its role can be demonstrated, for example, by the institution of  
sovereignty, as the exercise of  ultimate and autonomous authority.14 A cornerstone 
of  the international society, sovereignty insulates states from external interference 
in their domestic affairs and preserves the diversity of  their identities.
In the context of  socio-political diversification, the right to economic self-
determination does not presuppose the implementation of  a specific model of  eco-
nomic reconstruction that would influence the economic structures of  the state. 
The right only requires that the people are consulted in a voluntary manner, but 
this can occur in different systems of  political and economic organisation. Self-
determination, therefore, is in line with the legal principles of  non-intervention 
and sovereign equality, demonstrating that international law is neutral toward the 
form that states are governed internally.15
Thus, any measures imposed by international administrators to implement 
a market-oriented economy would not be compatible with the exercise of  the 
right. Whatever their choice is, whether a socialist or capitalist system, mixed, 
centrally planned, or laissez-faire, it is an international legal requirement that the 
people determine it without external interference.16 The role of  the international 
actors in such circumstances is perceived as facilitating the post-conflict operations 
through the provision of  resources, but these actors are prevented from determin-
ing a particular outcome of  the reconstruction process. This approach can be seen 
in line with the concept of  local ownership that was endorsed by the UN in 2001, 
as a best practice postulate of  sustainable development and peace. In the report 
‘No Exit without Strategy’ the Secretary-General observed:
[peace and development] can only be achieved by the local population itself; 
the role of  the United Nations is merely to facilitate the process that seeks to 
dismantle the structures of  violence and create the conditions conducive to 
durable peace and sustainable development.17 
13 N Tsagourias, ‘International Community, Recognition of  States, and Political Cloning’ in 
C Warbrick and S Tierney (eds), Towards an ‘International Legal Community’? (British Institute of  
International and Comparative Law 2006) 210, 215; see Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of  America) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, para 269.
14 See N Walker, ‘The EU and the WTO: Constitutionalism in a New Key’ in G De Burca and 
J Scott (eds), The EU and the WTO: Legal and Constitutional Aspects (Hart 2001) 21, 40.
15 See J Vidmar, Democratic Statehood in International Law: The Emergence of  New States in Post-Cold War 
Practice (Hart 2013).
16 Nicaragua (n 13) 259–263; see Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion) [1975] ICJ Rep 12 para 94: ‘No rule 
of  international law, in view of  the Court, requires the structure of  a State to follow any particular 
pattern, as is evident from the diversity of  the forms of  State found in the world today.’
17 UNSC, ‘No Exit without Strategy: Security Council Decision-making and the Closure or Transi-
tion of  United Nations Peacekeeping Operations’ (2001) UN Doc S/2001/394 para 12.
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Economic self-determination in international society remains therefore, ‘agnos-
tic’18 to the type of  economic system that is reformed in the post-conflict period 
and insulates it from extensive external involvement. At best, it requires interna-
tional actors to ascertain how the people of  the territory wish to organise their 
economy and guarantee their participation in decision-making processes.
Economic self-determination reconsidered
A revised understanding of  economic self-determination is examined in this sec-
tion. The right is considered here more closely to the internationally led prac-
tice of  post-conflict reconstruction and to the extent that the latter can have an 
impact on its interpretation. This approach suggests a different model of  eco-
nomic reconstruction from one that tolerates any type of  economic organisation. 
As Paris put it, the post-conflict operations are instances of  the globalisation of  a 
particular practice of  domestic governance that determines how the state should 
behave.19 Thus, it is a model in relation to which, international law and the right 
to economic self-determination have a broader impact on what the reforms of  
the economic system should look like.
Under the reconstruction process, the post-conflict territory is not the sover-
eign Westphalian state that determines its internal affairs autonomously.20 Hav-
ing failed to maintain peace and security, the state and its internal structures are 
placed at the centre of  international engagement to restore their governability. 
The tools and the end result of  the reform processes therefore become entan-
gled with the identity and objectives of  the international actors, who undertake 
this role because the domestic agents and infrastructure are largely absent or 
weak. In this respect, the right to self-determination no longer represents a rigid 
demarcation between the adoption of  internal decisions and the influence of  
external actors over them.21 The state rather experiences and reforms its politi-
cal and economic identity in relation to its approximation with other states and 
international actors with which it wishes to be associated in the international 
sphere. It adopts a specific identity and values, which are common to the inter-
national political and legal order embedding the post-conflict practices.22 The 
18 N Bhuta, ‘New Modes and Orders: The Difficulties of  a Jus Post Bellum of  Constitutional Tran-
sition’ (2010) NYUIL and Justice Working Paper No 2010/1; <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1574329> accessed 10 June 2014.
19 R Paris, ‘International Peacebuilding and the ‘Mission Civilisatrice’’ (2002) 28 Review of  Interna-
tional Studies 637 at 638.
20 D Chandler, ‘The Uncritical Critique of  ‘Liberal Peace’’ (2010) Review of  International Studies 137 at 
149.
21 See A Skordas, ‘Self-determination of  Peoples and Transnational Regimes: A Foundational Prin-
ciple of  Global Governance’ in Nicholas Tsagourias (ed), Transnational Constitutionalism (CUP 2007) 
207.
22 See J W Meyer, J Boli, G M Thomas, F O Ramirez, ‘World Society and the Nation-State’ (1997) 
1 American Journal of  Sociology 144; G S Drori, Y S Jang and J W Meyer, ‘Sources of  Rationalised 
Governance: National Longitudinal Analyses, 1985–2002’ (2006) 51 Administrative Science Quarterly 
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politico-legal space can be identified in this context as the international commu-
nity, which constitutes states, international organisations and non-governmental 
organisations. 23
As defined by Tsagourias, the international community is ‘characterised by 
shared norms and understandings, common sensibilities and a shared feeling of  
collective entity’.24 It is a sub-entity of  the international society and its members 
associate with each other because of  their common values.25 In contrast to the 
international society where members are autonomous and insulated from external 
interference, members of  the community open their domestic politico-legal orders 
to interaction with international norms and rules. They construct and develop 
their identity not only as a result of  their local circumstances but also with refer-
ence to the environment in which they are embedded. Thus, the degree of  inte-
gration of  a state into the international community is demonstrated by the extent 
not only to which it applies the latter’s value system in its external relations but also 
in its domestic legal system and governance.26 The actors of  the community build 
up a common conscience, in that they interpret phenomena and collective prob-
lems in common ways and strive to realise their values in their internal domains 
and in their external behaviour.27
For instance, the link between the domestic and the international can be observed 
in models of  best policy practices that emerge to provide solutions to challenges, 
such as human right violations, socioeconomic development and post-conflict 
reconstruction. These models are ‘universalised’,28 capable of  being applied to 
various degrees in different circumstances, and reflect the ‘common sense’ of  the 
actors involved and of  the international community more broadly. They result 
from the social expectations of  the international and domestic actors, be it the 
attainment of  socioeconomic development through open markets in the economy, 
democracy in politics, justice in law and peace in the international order. There-
fore, common outcomes in the economic infrastructure of  states can be traced in 
the widespread state practice to establish market-oriented economies since the 
end of  1980s and after the 1990s. Even though the models are not legally bind-
ing upon the state, they shape its behaviour so that the latter becomes a member 
205; see D Buhari-Gulmez, ‘Stanford School on Sociological Institutionalism: A Global Cultural 
Approach’ (2010) 4 International Political Sociology 253.
23 Tsagourias (n 13) 210–215; see D Kennedy, ‘Disciplines of  International Law and Policy’ (1999) 12 
Journal of  International Law 9 at 83; D Kritsiotis, ‘Imagining the International Community’ (2002) 
13 European Journal of  International Law 961.
24 Tsagourias ibid 212. 
25 For the relationship between the international society and community see N Tsagourias, ‘The 
Will of  the International Community as a Normative Source of  International’ in I E Dekker 
and W G Werner (ed), Governance and International Legal Theory (Martinus Nijhoff  2004) 97; 
B Buzan and A Golzalez-Pelaez, ‘‘International Community’ after Iraq’ (2005) International 
Affairs 31.
26 Tsagourias (n 13) 213.
27 Ibid.
28 Meyer (n 21) 173.
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of  the international community. Such an approach is taken by the World Bank, 
which has warned that in changing course, states must:
‘calculate not just the benefits and costs of  the policy reversal, but also the 
broader costs of  reneging on an international commitment for which their 
partners will hold them accountable. The threat of  international censure 
makes countries less likely to reverse course.’29
The effect that external standards can have on reconstruction can also be illus-
trated in the role of  the EU in reforming the economies and legal systems of  Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (BiH) and Kosovo. The identity of  the EU is founded on the 
values of  peace, democracy, the rule of  law and human rights. Its internal mar-
ket functions on the basis of  the principles of  an open market economy – private 
autonomy, the facilitation of  trade and competition and the free movement of  
goods, capital, services and people30 – and the rules that stem from primary and 
secondary legislation, as well as the case law of  the Court of  Justice. The principles, 
which the organisation adopts internally, are mirrored in the economic policies, 
including its post-conflict operations, that it pursues through its relations with other 
countries. In both cases of  BiH and Kosovo the reconstruction programmes had 
three premises: first, the promotion of  the values shared between the EU and the 
post-conflict territory, such as human rights, the rule of  law and market-orientated 
reforms; second, the facilitation of  common interests, among which are political 
stability in the region and the strengthening of  their trade and economic rela-
tions; third, integration into the international economy.31 The main strategies were 
implemented through the Stability Pact and the Stability and Socialisation Process, 
which continues to be the main EU policy in the region. Their main aims were to 
build new economic institutions and assimilate their legal systems with the regula-
tion of  the EU internal market, preparing them for future EU membership.32 That 
way, the post-conflict territories could move closer to regional economic integration 
and the EU could expand not only geographically, if  accession were realised, but 
also geopolitically by projecting its values and economic ties with them.
It is in this context of  ‘enforcing standards’33 in the internal governance of  the 
state that post-conflict reconstruction can be viewed. It can explain the relative 
29 WB, World Development Report 1997. The State in a Changing World (IBRD 1997) 101; see D Nicol, The 
Constitutional Protection of  Capitalism (Hart 2010).
30 A Hatje, ‘The Economic Constitution within the Internal Market’ in A von Bogdandy and J Bast 
(eds), Principles of  European Constitutional Law (2nd edn, Hart 2010).
31 This is evident in the Stabilisation Pact for South Eastern Europe and European Neighbourhood 
Policy. See EU’s accession policies Art 49 TEU; Ana E Juncos, ‘The EU’s post-Conflict Interven-
tion in Bosnia and Herzegovina: (re)Integrating the Balkans and/or (re)Inventing the EU?’ (2005) 
VI Southeast European Politics 88.
32 M Cremona, ‘Values in the EU Constitution: The External Dimension’ (2004) Working Paper 
No 26; <http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/20739/Cremona-Values_in_the_EU_Constitution-
External__Relations.pdf> accessed 2 June 2014.
33 Tsagourias (n 13) 213.
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isomorphism that is apparent in post-conflict settings, where models of  good gov-
ernance are implemented through international institutions, notably the UN, the 
WB and the IMF, but also through non-governmental organisations and business 
actors.34 From a thick socio-political perspective therefore, the scope of  economic 
self-determination in the international community is broader because it assesses 
the quality of  governance within the state. The parameters of  the right do not 
only entitle participation in the decision-making processes but also guarantee that 
the negotiators have something to negotiate about, such as the implementation of  
economic and political freedoms in the domestic legal system.35 The right becomes 
then also mediated between the international and national actors rather than being 
only the concern of  the latter. The terms of  the debate and the mechanisms of  the 
reforms evaluate the internal order of  the state and its consistency with the norms 
of  the international community. It is within these terms that self-determination can 
be negotiated and realised to construct the economic infrastructure of  the state in 
compliance with its international policy and legal obligations.
The practice of  constitution-making is analysed in the following section, as a 
site at which international policy and law can have an impact on substantive con-
stitutional provisions.
Forming the constitutional identity of  
the post-conflict state
One of  the characteristics of  constitutions is that they are ‘statements of  national 
identity and aspiration that serve to differentiate countries from one another’.36 
When people are deciding about their constitution they translate their choices 
about how they wish to be constituted into law. For that reason, constitution-making 
can be seen as a means for the people to exercise their right to self-determination 
and determine their political, economic, social and cultural organisation. Demo-
cratic constitutional processes today assume a participatory, inclusive and trans-
parent nature to ensure that the constitution reflects general consensus and the 
wishes of  the people.37 Especially in the post-conflict context, wide participation 
serves the reconciliation of  different groups and satisfies the diverse views of  the 
domestic constituencies.38 International law, however, does not provide specific 
34 Meyer (n 21) 158–164.
35 See C Bell, On the Law of  Peace: Peace Agreements and the Lex Pacificatoria (OUP 2008).
36 D S Law and M Versteeg, ‘The Evolution and Ideology of  Global Constitutionalism’ (2011) 99 Cali-
fornia LR 1163 at1172. See Z Elkins, T Ginsburg, B Simmons, ‘Getting to Rights: Treaty Ratification, 
Constitutional Convergence, and Human Rights Practice’ (2013) 54 Harvard International Law Journal 62. 
37 See U K Preuss, ‘Perspectives on Post-conflict Constitutionalism: Reflections on Regime Change 
Through External Constitutionalisation’ (2006) 51 NY School Law Review 468 at 469–470, 477–
480s; K Diehl et al., ‘Max Planck Manuals on Constitution Building: Structures and Principles 
of  a Constitution’ (2nd edn, Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International 
Law, 2009) 4, 2; <http://zung.zetamu.net/Files/mpil_constitutionalism_manual_2009_2.pdf> 
accessed 23 March 2014.
38 Bell (n 34) 296–300.
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rules for constitution-making processes. It entails only a ‘general requirement’39 
for public consultation in governance, which stems from Article 25 ICCPR.40 This 
has influenced the practice and expectations of  constitution drafters around the 
world but does not create any clear legal obligations on the part of  the interna-
tional actors.41 Beyond these procedural guarantees, considerable influence can be 
observed on the substantive constitutional provisions, which affect the economic 
organisation of  the country.42
Indicative here are comparative studies of  national constitutions around the 
world. Law and Versteeg have conducted an analysis of  the rights-related content 
of  all constitutions over the last six decades and have concluded that there is a core 
set of  rights that is included in the vast majority of  constitutions and that the num-
ber of  these rights increases over time.43 The most popular rights include freedom 
of  religion, freedom of  the press and/or expression and equality guarantees, all of  
which appeared in 97% of  the world’s constitutions in 2006, followed by the right 
to privacy (95%), prohibition of  arbitrary arrest and detention (94%), right of  
assembly (94%) and the right of  association (93%). The right to private property 
has also been one of  the most popular ones being found in 97% of  all constitu-
tions. Limits on property rights have also been found in 73% of  constitutions and 
the use of  natural resources for the benefit of  all in 29%.44
The amount of  common rights increases over time for two reasons. First, when 
a country adds a constitutional provision, others imitate it in order to adopt the 
best practices and gain the approval of  domestic and international actors – a kind 
of  ‘race to the bottom’45 protection of  constitutional rights. Second, states incor-
porate more human rights in order to improve their competitiveness in attracting 
foreign capital and skilled labour – a kind of  ‘race to the top’ protection.46 That 
way constitutional provisions relating to the economy are signals to external actors 
of  the type of  economic system that the country is developing. As it is expected 
39 T M Franck and A K Thiruvengadam, ‘Norms of  International Law Relating to the Constitution-
Making Process’ in L E Miller (ed), Framing the State in Times of  Transition Case Studies in Constitution 
Making (US Institute of  Peace Press 2010) 3, 14; <http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/Fram
ing%20the%20State/Chapter1_Framing.pdf> accessed 15 July 2014.
40 See HRC, General Comment 25, ‘The right to participate in public affairs, voting rights and the 
right to equal access to public service (Art 25)’ CCPR/C/21/Rev1/Add7 (1996). 
41 For analysis of  the practice see T M Franck and A K Thiruvengadam, ‘International Law and 
Constitution-Making’ (2003) 2 Chinese Journal of  International Law 467; see also the chapter by 
Turner and Houghton in this volume.
42 Diehl (n 36) 4, 5, 48.
43 Law (n 35) 1170.
44 Ibid at 1200–1201. For the role of  property rights in the economy see D Kennedy, ‘Some Cau-
tion about Property Rights as a Recipe for Economic Development’ (2011) 1 Accounting, Econom-
ics, and Law 1; S Piccioto ‘Paradoxes of  Regulating Corporate Capitalism: Property Rights and 
Hyper-Regulation’ (2011) 1 Onati Socio-Legal Studies; <http://opo.iisj.net/index.php/osls/article/
view/74/177> accessed 12 May 2014.
45 D S Law, ‘Globalization and the Future of  Constitutional Rights’ (2008) 102 Northwestern University 
Law Review 1277, 1282. 
46 Ibid.
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therefore, it is common practice that the right to private property is contained in 
the majority of  post-conflict constitutions. For example, it is found in Sections 54 
and 60 of  the constitution of  Timor-Leste, Article 23 of  Iraq’s (also Article 16 
under Transitional Administrative Law), Articles 40 and 41 of  Afghanistan’s and 
Article 46 of  Kosovo’s.
The resulting constitutional convergence does not necessarily mean that the 
constitutional rights are implemented in practice, as their protection depends upon 
national legislation and long-term economic policies. It is important however, 
because it represents an element of  the internationalised process of  post-conflict 
reconstruction, which permeates domestic orders, and has strong implications for 
the substantive aspects of  the constitution. Louis Aucoin, advisory to the Constitu-
tional Commission of  Kosovo, explained that the negotiations over the country’s 
constitution were directed by the Kosovars, especially in deciding the political sys-
tem they wanted to set up. The drafting however, was based on other constitutions 
that were used as models, especially those of  regional countries such as Croatia, 
Albania, Slovenia and Greece, and of  countries that are mostly influential in civil 
law, such as France and Germany. The constitution essentially incorporated every 
provision of  the Ahttisari Plan that had been proposed as an international solu-
tion to the Security Council but had never been adopted because of  the objec-
tions raised by Russia. Consistency with the Plan, along with the endorsement of  
European standards of  governance,47 was necessary to secure the approval of  the 
international community, with the exception of  Russia, Spain, Greece and Roma-
nia, and increase the chances of  Kosovo’s recognition.48
Constitution-making practice shows that the economic identity of  the post-
conflict state is an indicative factor of  the extent to which the state has adopted 
the values and standards of  behaviour expected from its operation in the inter-
national community and the international economy. Post-conflict constitutions 
define the economic organisation of  the state with the corresponding rights and 
duties that are concomitant to a market-orientated economy, such as the right to 
private property.
Within this framework of  constitution-making, the impact that international 
policy and law have on the process and substance of  constitutions varies. On 
the one hand, international law does not provide any clear rules that define the 
process of  constitution-making and the extent or mode of  participation of  local 
actors. The absence of  regulation, therefore, does not guarantee the implementa-
tion of  certain procedures. The extent of  citizen representation then depends on 
the mechanisms that the international actors establish and encourage participa-
tion, as a best practice postulate.
47 UNMIK/PISG, ‘Standards Before Status’ (2004); <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/
cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27–4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Kos%20Standards.pdf> accessed 
24 July 2014.
48 ‘On Constitution Writing: The Case of  Kosovo. Interview with Professor Louis Aucoin’ (2008) 
XXIII The Fletcher Journal of  Human Security 123.
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However, the engagement of  international actors in these processes creates 
certain expectations related to the substantive content of  the constitution. As the 
international actors facilitate the people of  the territory to exercise their right to 
self-determination by setting up the negotiations for the drafting of  their constitu-
tion, the nature of  self-determination that they promote is within the parameters, 
which restore the governability of  the territory in compliance with international 
norms and standards. In particular, it is both the desire of  the state to accept 
international assistance and integrate it into the international community, as well 
as the imperative of  restoring international peace and security, which renders 
the community a stakeholder in post-conflict reconstruction.49 To achieve these 
goals, the community ensures that the constitutional provisions of  the debate 
and the outcomes it pursues represents its own internal value system. Thereby, 
self-determination does not represent only the internal actors, but accommo-
dates the interdependence of  both the local and international parties in forming 
the state that can be recognised and participate in the international community. 
Self-determination then reinvents the ‘self ’ anew with the tools provided by the 
external order.
The role of  international law
The difficulty in identifying applicable international law and how it affects the 
practice of  reconstruction rests on the fact that there is not a lex specialis for 
post-conflict situations;50 international law has not developed separate rules for 
the regulation of  post-conflict reconstruction. International humanitarian law, 
international human rights and international criminal law have expanded their 
scopes to apply to such situations, although not always in a clear manner. Inter-
national humanitarian law for example, has been revised to regulate the aims 
of  transformative occupation;51 international criminal law has developed rules 
on amnesties and transitional justice;52 international human rights law contrib-
utes to democratic representation and pluralism. However, there is a lack of  
an integrated approach to understanding how international rules related to the 
economy are applicable in the transitional period and affect the reconstruction 
process.
Considering the purposes of  post-conflict economic programmes in the 
international community, the reforms can also be understood in terms of  the 
49 See P Dann and ZAl-Ali, ‘The Internationalized Pouvoir Constituant: Constitution-Making under 
External Influence in Iraq, Sudan and East Timor’ (2006) 10 Max Planck Yearbook of  United Nations 
Law 423; E Hay, ‘International(ised) Constitutions and Peacebuilding’ (2014) 27 Leiden Journal of  
International Law 141.
50 C Stahn and J K Kleffner (eds), Jus Post Bellum: Towards a Law of  Transition from Conflict to Peace (TMC 
Asser Press 2008).
51 A Roberts, ‘Transformative Military Occupation: Applying the Laws of  War and Human Rights’ 
(2006) 100 American Journal of  International Law 580.
52 Bell (n 34).
8328-0003-PII-009.indd   196 2/4/2015   5:37:34 PM
Economic self-determination in post-conflict reconstruction 197
international legal obligations of  the post-conflict state.53 The international 
rules and norms that regulate the economic reconstruction of  post-conflict states 
emerge from a variety of  sources, such as international investment law, trade 
law and international human rights. These rules and norms restrict the regula-
tory autonomy of  the state by being implemented through national constitutions 
and thematic legislation and by complementing functions of  governance. They 
define the internationally accepted standards of  post-conflict reconstruction 
and the obligations that the state assumes in determining its economic arrange-
ments with transnational entities. These rules do not form a wholly uniform 
area of  ‘post-conflict law’ but are followed by the wide practice of  the actors 
that participate in the post-conflict reconstruction, such as states, international 
organisations, notably the UN, the WB and the IMF, and non-governmental 
organisations.
From this perspective, the role of  international law in regulating the post-conflict 
economic reforms is that it offers universal prescriptions to rebuild a particular 
type of  state. Its potential in regulating the post-conflict operations is affected by 
the fact that it is constructed and operates within the international community, 
where there is no rigid boundary between the domestic space of  governance and 
the ‘outside’. International law, then, does not remain apolitical but translates the 
‘policy orientation’54 of  the international community, as expressed in this case 
through the post-conflict reconstruction process, into the corollary legal rights and 
duties.
Rules that have an impact on the understanding of  economic self-determination 
relate to the field of  international economic law, in particular international 
investment law, which legally constrains the operation of  the state in the tran-
sitional period. International investment rules,55 which emanate from a dense 
institutional fabric that supersedes the state – OECD, NAFTA, Energy Char-
ter Treaty and the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, 2,857 of  BITs,56 and 
UNCITRAL – provide substantive rights to foreign investors. Moreover, the com-
mon standards included in the majority of  BITs can be argued to have emerged 
into customary international law.57 This has important implications for the post-
conflict state, because even if  it has become a party to a limited number of  BITs, 
which determine the bilateral relations between the host state and the investors, 
the latter is still bound by customary international rules. Examples of  such rules 
include the fair and equitable treatment of  foreign investors, equal treatment of  
national and foreign investors and protection from direct expropriation without 
53 R Wilde, International Territorial Administration (OUP 2008) 442 suggests that international territorial 
administrations be considered ‘as the internationalised version of  a state-conducted paradigm, the 
institution is part of  the broader move towards international law and international institutions that 
took place in the 20th century, particularly in its second half ’.
54 Kennedy (n 22) 33.
55 D Schneiderman, Constitutionalizing Economic Globalisation (CUP 2008).
56 UNCTAD, World Investment Report (UN 2013).
57 For an opposite view see M Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (CUP 2004).
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full compensation. 58 In the process of  establishing a market economy, these rules 
become part of  the domestic legal system.59
The parameters of  the economic reconstruction of  the state and its legal rights 
and duties are also determined by the prospects of  its accession to international 
organisations. Membership in the WTO, for example, requires a package of  rules, 
which reforms the domestic economic policies and legislation, and influences the 
capacity of  the state to pursue socioeconomic policies that are not consistent with 
the rules of  the Organisation. For BiH and Kosovo, their prospects of  accession 
to the WTO, but also to the EU, had a significant impact on harmonising their 
national legal systems with international trade rules.60 For the example of  Timor-
Leste, the government has not applied to accede to the WTO, but it has applied 
for membership in ASEAN. In such a case, it will negotiate the free trade agree-
ments regulating the ASEAN Free Trade Area, which will also have a significant 
effect on the laws of  the country.61 It becomes apparent, therefore, that to the 
extent that the post-conflict state commits to engaging with the international eco-
nomic order and the international community, the potential of  international law 
is to internalise the rules, which promote an open market and guarantee the state’s 
compliance with international rules and customary international law.62
To conclude this section, what emerges from the post-conflict operations is a 
network of  international rules adapting to the asymmetric legal relations between 
the international administrators and the local actors and between legal author-
ity and social expectations. Old rules adopt new functions and are reinterpreted 
to apply to this context,63 as economic self-determination does. That said, both 
understandings of  the right coexist in the socio-political relations of  states in the 
international society and the international community. For that reason, the appli-
cation of  economic self-determination in post-conflict operations can be mani-
fested both in the efforts of  international parties to receive the consent of  the state 
58 OECD, ‘Fair and equitable treatment standard in international investment law’ (2004) Work-
ing Papers on International Investment 2004/3; <http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/
download/5lgsjhvj76d0.pdf ?expires=1402481131&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=EC2D2
B43AF834840EDE9A450F4F994FE> accessed 10 March 2014; R Dolzer and C Schreuer, Prin-
ciples of  International Investment Law (2nd edn, OUP 2012).
59 See K Boon ‘“Open For Business”: International Financial Institutions, Post-conflict Economic 
Reform, and the Rule of  “Law”’ (2007) NYU International Law and Politics 513; for the role of  inter-
national trade law see Audi (n 1) 344. 
60 For example, one of  the most important measures was the signing of  Central European Free Trade 
Agreement in 2006. See SCSP Constituent Document, Cologne Document (1999); <http://www.
stabilitypact.org/constituent/990610-cologne.asp accessed> 12 May 2014; S Kathuria, Western 
Balkan Integration and the EU. An Agenda for Growth (IBRD 2008).
61 ‘Growing Together Inclusively: Regional Integration, ASEAN, and Timor Leste’ Speech Delivered 
at Inaugural Seminar on ASEAN Economic Community by 2015: Challenges and Opportunities 
for Timor-Leste Membership; <http://www.unescap.org/speeches/growing-together-inclusively-
regional-integration-asean-and-timor-leste accessed 5 March 2014.
62 R Dolzer, ‘New Foundations of  the Law of  Expropriation of  Alien Property’ (1981) 71 American 
Journal of  International Law 553 at 576–579.
63 Bell (n 34).
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or local actors before their engagement, as a requirement of  the international 
society, and the endorsement of  the values and standards of  the associational 
international community by the post-conflict territory.
The following section considers the economic reforms that took place in Timor-
Leste. The case study is relevant to the above discussion because a UN administra-
tion was established, which undertook the legislative, executive and administrative 
powers of  the territory for two-and-a-half  years. For that reason, the reconstruc-
tion of  Timor-Leste illustrates how international involvement had an important 
role in assisting the transition to an open market economy. Two more aspects, 
however, make the case study relevant for the purposes of  self-determination.
First, Timor-Leste demonstrates the difficulties of  assessing self-determination 
in a post-conflict context where there is no state infrastructure and a body which 
represents the will of  the people and can govern effectively. Second, from the 
beginning of  the international administration, the aim and outcome of  the post-
conflict operation had been pre-determined by a referendum that the territory 
would become an independent state. This aspect is crucial because it differenti-
ates Timor-Leste from other cases, such as Kosovo, where the administration was 
set up for an indefinite period. In this framework, the case of  Timor-Leste is a 
successful example where the right to economic self-determination, in its wider 
interpretation offered above, was in operation, as both the local and international 
actors leading the reconstruction process aimed at creating a state in compliance 
with the principles of  the international community.
Case study: Timor-Leste64
Background
East Timor had been a Portuguese colony from the middle of  1850s until the mid-
dle of  1970s. In 1975, Indonesian forces invaded the territory and occupied it until 
1999. Following internal political changes, Indonesia agreed to hold a referendum 
in East Timor for the people of  the territory to decide between independence or 
integration into Indonesia as an autonomous region. The referendum took place 
in August 1999, with 90% participation of  the population; 78.5% voted in favour 
of  independence. However, pro-integration militias that did not agree with the 
result started a new wave of  violence causing the death and displacement of  many 
Timorese nationals and the assault of  international officers. Being under strong 
international pressure, Indonesia formally accepted the results of  the referendum 
and started removing its troops from East Timor. It also agreed with Portugal to 
transfer authority to the UN until local authorities could take over.
In October 1999, the United Nations Transitional Administration in East 
Timor (UNTAET) was established under SC Resolution 1272 (1999). Its mandate 
64 The name East Timor is used when referring to events that occurred before 2002. For events after 
2002 and the establishment of  the independent state, the name Timor-Leste is used.
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was (a) to provide security and maintain law and order throughout the territory 
of  East Timor; (b) establish an effective administration; (c) assist in the devel-
opment of  civil and social services; (d) ensure the coordination and delivery of  
humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and development assistance; (e) support 
capacity-building for self-government; and (f) assist in the establishment of  condi-
tions for sustainable development.65 UNTAET could pass legislation on almost 
any civil and economic sector, as it exercised full ‘legislative and executive author-
ity, including the administration of  justice’66 in the territory. The applicable law 
during the transitional period and after the first government was elected was a mix 
of  UNTAET Regulations and Indonesian laws that had not been replaced.67 On 
20 May 2002, East Timor officially gained its independence and, on the same day, 
its Constitution came into force. The new state was named Timor-Leste.
Economic reforms: ‘from subsistence to a market economy’
The referendum on independence and the transition from a non-self-governing 
territory to a sovereign state was a significant act of  external self-determination on 
the part of  the Timorese population. The post-conflict reconstruction period was 
not only a process of  transition from conflict to peace but also a project to build 
a new state and institutions that would be governed by the Timorese people.68 A 
Joint Assessment Mission of  the WB that took place in 1999 reported that the 
economic situation in East Timor was very different from the typical contexts in 
other post-conflict countries. It was as if  ‘a vicious hurricane [had] destroyed all 
buildings and most crops and removed all records and institutional memory’.69
The rapid departure of  the Indonesian civil authorities had resulted in a vac-
uum in public administration and the collapse of  public institutions. The involve-
ment of  the UN, therefore, was necessary to assist the local actors develop their 
capacities in order to eventually undertake the administration and governance of  
the state. Three aspects of  the reconstruction operations, which are relevant to the 
right to economic self-determination, are mentioned below: first, the involvement 
of  the Timorese in the decision-making procedures to initiate the international 
administration; second, the participation of  local actors during the post-conflict 
65 UNSC Res 1272 (25 October 1999); UN Doc S/RES/1272 para 2.
66 Ibid, para 1.
67 UNTAET Regulation 1999/1, ‘On the Transitional Administration in East Timor’ UNTAET/
REG/1991/1 (27 November 1999), Section 3.
68 See C Stahn, ‘The United Nations Transitional Administrations in Kosovo and East Timor: A 
First Analysis’ (2001) 5 Max Planck United Nations Yearbook 105; R Wilde, ‘From Danzig to East 
Timor and Beyond: The Role of  International Territorial Administration (2001) 95 American Jour-
nal of  International Law 583.
69 WB, ‘Project Performance Assessment Report Timor Leste’ (30 June 2008) Report No 44468, 5; 
<http://lnweb90.worldbank.org/oed/oeddoclib.nsf/24cc3bb1f94ae11c85256808006a0046/3ff
799fd356553f485257ba500737fc9/$FILE/PPAR-44468-P075796-Timor_Leste_TSP_I_II_III.
pdf> accessed 21 March 2014.
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reconstruction; third, the content of  the economic reforms that followed the dis-
solution of  UNTAET. These instances are selected because they demonstrate 
how economic self-determination was exercised at three different points in time: 
before, during and after UNTAET.
First, the Timorese nationals had been indirectly consulted by the UN officials 
as to whether they consented to the international administration. The legal basis of  
UNTAET was SC Resolution 1272 but the initiative for international engangement 
had been agreed before the 1999 referendum and the outbreak of  hostilities. On 
5 May 1999, the governments of  Indonesia and Portugal had signed an Agreement 
under the auspices of  the UN, which set out the organisation of  the referendum by a 
UN mission. Articles 6 and 7, in particular, stipulated that in the event that the out-
come of  the public consultation was in favour of  independence the administration 
of  the territory would be transferred to the UN to enable the transitional process.70
The decision not to include Timorese nationals in the preparation of  the Agree-
ment and the establishment of  UNTAET can be explained by the political circum-
stances surrounding the negotiations. The Indonesian Army was not willing at that 
time to withdraw from the territory and the participation of  Timorese in the talks 
could, therefore, compromise the intentions of  Indonesia to reach an agreement.71
On the one hand, the omission to involve Timorese nationals directly in these 
decision-making processes and the lack of  their express consent as to whether they 
wished to be supervised by the UN could be considered a significant limitation of  
their right to self-determination. It would be a restriction that would affect not 
only the procedural requirement of  popular participation but would also have 
substantive implications for the reconstruction. That is because acceptance of  
the international engagement by local actors suggests that the latter also agree to 
building a democratic state with respect for human rights, the rule of  law and a 
market-oriented economy in accordance with international norms and standards. 
Rejection of  international involvement, however, indicates that the domestic actors 
choose to follow their own path to post-conflict reconstruction without external 
involvement. Consequently, the lack of  any effort to receive consent could signify 
that the reconstruction process does not comply with the wishes of  the population 
and that any subsequent reforms could restrict the right of  Timorese to choose 
their political and economic organisation.
However, such a debate could be resolved by the fact that UN officials had con-
sulted regularly with the Timorese throughout the whole negotiating process of  
the May Agreement. National representatives had organised themselves through 
the Council of  Timorese Resistance (CNRT) in 1997 and, as it was reported, had 
70 Agreement between the Republic of  Indonesia and the Portuguese Republic on the question of  
East Timor 1999 (May Agreement), Arts 6, 7; see UNGA ‘Question East Timor. Report of  the 
Secretary-General’ (1999) UN Doc A/53/951; preamble of  Resolution 1272 that recalled the 
May Agreement.
71 See A Suhrke, ‘Peacekeepers as Nation-builders: Dilemmas of  the UN in East Timor’ (2001) 8 
International Peacekeeping 1, 4. 
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readily accepted Article 6 of  the Agreement and their transition to independence 
under the auspices of  the UN.72 Examining the validity of  consent in this case would 
be a relevant factor to the law of  self-determination. Notwithstanding, the law 
demonstrates a certain degree of  openness related the identification of  the appro-
priate local actors that provide valid consent and lead the reconstruction process.73 
In the absence of  strict legal criteria regulating the identity of  actors and mode of  
consent, these indirect consultations with organised nationals could be viewed as 
an important step to ascertaining the wishes of  the people of  a territory without a 
government and experience in state administration.
Second, UNTAET ensured that Timorese nationals participated in decision-
making processes from the early steps of  the post-conflict period. According to 
Regulation 1999/1, the Transitional Administrator of  UNTAET was under 
an obligation to ‘consult and cooperate closely with representatives of  the East 
Timorese people’.74 To that effect, the National Consultative Council (subse-
quently substituted by the National Council) and the National Cabinet were estab-
lished with the aim to provide the proper framework for involving the local actors 
in the administration of  the territory.75 The two bodies consisted primarily of  
Timorese representatives of  political groups and civil society and both had quasi-
legislative powers. They could recommend and draft regulations and formulate 
policies, which would guide the legislative powers of  UNTAET. The establish-
ment of  these bodies constituted a significant procedural measure for the exercise 
of  the right to internal self-determination, including its economic aspect. Indeed, 
their contribution might be observed in the substantive economic measures that 
were adopted during the post-conflict period, as will be discussed later, particu-
larly in relation to legislating on property rights.
Third, the reconstruction of  the post-conflict territory under the assistance of  
the international administration and the involvement of  other international actors, 
such as the WB and the IMF, meant that the domestic legal system of  Timor-Leste 
would be reformed to adopt the standards of  good governance and the rules of  
international law. For example, the measures prioritised development goals, which 
corresponded to the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), as indicated in the 
72 M Benzing, ‘Midwifing a New State: The United Nations in East Timor’ (2005) 9 Max Planck 
United Nations Yearbook 295 at 307; see J Morrow and R White, ‘The United Nations in Transitional 
East Timor: International Standards and the Reality of  Governance’ (2002) 22 Australian YBIL 1.
73 See Chapter 1 of  this volume by M Saul ‘International Law and the Identification of  an Interim 
Government to Lead to Post-conflict Reconstruction’; M Saul, ‘International Law and the Will 
of  the People in Post-Conflict Rebuilding’ in The Future of  Statebuilding: Ethics, Power and Responsibil-
ity in International Relations (2010); <https://www.westminster.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0009/
81594/Saul.pdf> accessed 23 June 2014.
74 Regulation 1999/1, Section 1.
75 UNTAET Regulation 1999/2, ‘On the establishment of  a National Consultative Council’ 
UNTAET/REG/1999/2 (2 December 1999); UNTAET Regulation 2000/23, ‘On the Establish-
ment of  the Cabinet of  the Transitional Government in East Timor’ UNTAET/REG/2000/23 
(14 July 2000) and UNTAET Regulation 2000/24, ‘On the Establishment of  the National Coun-
cil’ UNTAET/REG/2000/24 (14 July 2000).
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2002 National Development Plan (NDP) of  the country. The primary objective, 
however, was the transition from subsistence to market economy securing sustain-
able development and social goals, such as gender equality and social inclusion. 
According to the NDP there were three principles, which, among others, defined 
the management of  the economy:
(a) a market economic system with strategic and regulatory roles for Govern-
ment, including the provision of  social safety nets, (b) a strong role for the 
private sector in development (c) a role for government to ensure that physical 
and social infrastructure and services are provided, and to provide a growth 
enabling policy and legal environment, including the maintenance of  mon-
etary and fiscal stability.76
These policy objectives and international law had a significant impact on the 
post-conflict economic reforms and national legislation that was implemented. 
The constitution of  Timor-Leste is a notable example of  the extent to which inter-
national law has affected the legal system of  the country. The drafting process 
of  the constitution involved a significant degree of  community consultations and 
public hearings, which took place throughout the drafting period. To that effect, 
an elected Constitutional Assembly consisting primarily of  Timorese nationals 
conducted the negotiations on the constitution.77 It has been suggested that the 
Assembly was dominated by Fretilin members (the political party that had con-
tributed to the independence movement from Indonesia) and that the public con-
sultation of  the final constitutional draft was inadequate because it was carried 
out over just one month, from June to July 2001.78 The constitutional provisions 
however, were decided by the local actors providing, in the words of  Graham 
Nicholson, a real effort to reach out to the wider population in the process and 
with the constitution makers being democratically chosen by the people. Surpris-
ingly, it is apparent that western constitutional concepts were mainly employed in 
the process in East Timor, the view being that they derived from the Mozambican 
example, which in turn, was derived from the Portuguese Constitution.79
The influence of  UNTAET was demonstrated primarily in setting the legal 
framework and timeline for electing the Assembly and organising the drafting 
processes but reserved a ‘hands-off ’ approach in relation to the substance of  the 
constitutional provisions.80 UNTAET’s role then was to guarantee the appropriate 
procedures since the early stages of  the transitional period so that the Timorese 
76 East Timor NDP 2002 (Planning Commission Dili May 2002) 20, para 2.15; <http://siteresources.
worldbank.org/INTPRS1/Resources/Timor-Leste_PRSP(may2002).pdf> accessed 30 January 2014.
77 UNTAET Regulation 2001/2 ‘On the Election of  a Constituent Assemblyto Prepare a Constitu-
tion for an Independent and Democratic East Timor’ UNTAET/REG/2001/2 (16 March 2001).
78 See L Aucoin and M Brandt, ‘East Timor’s Constitutional Passage to Independence’ in Miller (n 38). 
79 G Nicholson, ‘Observations on the New Constitution of  East Timor’ (2002) 27 Alternative Law 
Journal 203 at 204.
80 Aucoin (n 77) 265.
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people could negotiate and decide on the future of  their country and therefore to 
exercise their right to self-determination. The fact that the constitution was adopted 
by an elected Assembly following an act of  independence is evidence to that effect. 
The impact of  international law, however, is apparent in the substantive provisions 
of  the constitution. The domestic legal system is required to incorporate custom-
ary international law and all international rules provided by international treaties, 
which Timor-Leste has ratified.81 The list of  constitutional provisions that protect 
human rights is extensive and comparable with the constitutional guarantees of  
most democratic states.82 It incorporates all generally recognised civil, political, 
socioeconomic and cultural rights and specifies that they should be interpreted in 
accordance with the Universal Declaration of  Human Rights.83
The constitution also includes an express provision for the protection of  the 
right to private property, which brings it in line with the majority of  national con-
stitutions around the world.84 The right to private ownership of  land is granted, 
however, only to Timorese nationals. The restriction secures state control over the 
natural resources and is common in neighbouring countries, such as Australia, 
Papua Guinea and Philippines. Instead, foreigners may contract leases for up to 
50 years.85 Section 54 also incorporates the international customary standards 
for the protection of  foreign property from expropriation. It permits the right of  
the state to expropriate and nationalise property but only for public purposes, in 
accordance with the law and upon the payment of  fair compensation.
During the two-and-a-half  years of  its operation before the election of  the 
Timorese government, UNTAET passed regulations on bank licensing, customs, 
taxes, registration of  businesses and labour to create an enabling environment for 
the private sector. Regulation 2000/1 established the Central Fiscal Authority, under the 
supervision of  the Transitional Administrator, to formulate tax policies and prepare 
the budget of  East Timor. The Banking and Payments Authority was promulgated, 
as a step toward creating a central bank after independence.86 The mandate of  
the Authority was to license and supervise banks, regulate their liquidity and sol-
vency in a stable market-based manner, execute the foreign exchange policy of  East 
Timor and promote a sound payment system. Its operations were also established 
in compliance with international accounting standards issued by the International 
Accounting Standards Committee. As a result of  these measures, a new institutional 
structure for economic policy emerged under the authority of  UNTAET.
81 Constitution of  the Democratic Republic of  Timor-Leste 2002, Section 9.
82 Law (n 35).
83 Section 23.
84 Section 54. Other treaties, for example, which contain provisions for the protection of  property rights 
and to which Timor-Lest is a party: Convention relating to the Status of  Refugees 1951 Art 13; 
International Convention on the Elimination of  All Forms of  Racial Discrimination 1965 Art 5 and 
Convention to Eliminate all forms of  Discrimination against Women 1979 Arts 15 and 16. 
85 Decree Law No 19/2004 Legal Regime of  Immovable Property: Official Allocation and Lease of  
State Property, Art 14.
86 UNTAET Regulation 2001/30, ‘On the Banking and Payments Authority’ UNTAET/REG/
2001/30 (30 November 2001). 
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Under the broad mandate of  UNTAET, set out in Regulation 1999/1, these 
measures fell within the jurisdiction of  the international administrators to estab-
lish the foundations for self-governance in the territory. A crucial issue of  the 
post-conflict reconstruction strategy, however, was the identification and regis-
tration of  property rights. The nature of  this issue was highly controversial and 
it was not possible to implement any permanent solutions during the period of  
international administration. One of  the most important problems was caused 
by the regime changes that had taken place in the territory, from the Portuguese 
colonial administration to the occupation authorities by Indonesia. They resulted 
in conflicts of  property titles over a single parcel of  land between persons who 
held property titles issued by Portuguese authorities before 1975 but had been dis-
possessed by the Indonesian occupation, and persons who had acquired the titles 
during the occupation. Under international humanitarian law, the occupation 
regime was deemed illegal and thus the property titles issued by the Indonesian 
authorities were void.87 At the same time, however, the annulment of  the prop-
erty rights under the Indonesian titles would result in massive evictions. Arguably, 
the evictions could breach human rights protected by international law, such as 
Article 11(1) of  ICCPR, Article 27(3) of  the Convention on the Rights of  the 
Child and Article 14(2)(h) of  CEDAW, to which Timor-Leste acceded in 2003.88
Indeed, no permanent solution was found by UNTAET and the issue remained 
to be resolved by the elected government after 2002. Under Regulation 1999/1, 
UNTAET had the authority to administer ‘immovable or movable property’ reg-
istered in the name of  Indonesia, as well as property ‘privately owned that was 
abandoned after 30 August 1999, the date of  the popular consultation, until such 
time as the lawful owners are determined’.89 The mandate, however, did not allow 
the adoption of  permanent measures that would affect the ownership of  property. 
UNTAET for example, had drafted legislation that would promote the registra-
tion of  property rights, the establishment of  a Land Commission and alternative 
dispute settlements but the National Cabinet rejected it.90 The major mechanism 
that UNTAET established then, following the recommendations of  the Cabinet, 
was the provision of  temporary use agreements over public or abandoned prop-
erty.91 The purpose of  this measure was to regulate the occupancy of  these prop-
erties by Timorese nationals in the short- and mid-term and to convert them to 
temporary sites for foreign investments. At the same time, these agreements would 
87 See Y Ronen, Transition from Illegal Regimes under International Law (CUP 2011) 292.
88 See D Fitzpatrick, ‘Property Rights in East Timor’s Reconstruction and Development’ in H Hill and 
J M Saldanha (eds), Development Challenges for the World’s Newest Nation (Asia Pacific Press, 2001) 177.
89 Regulation 1999/1, Section 1.
90 UNSC, ‘Report of  the Secretary-General on the UNTAET (for the period 27 July 2000 to 16 Jan-
uary 2001)’ (2001) UN Doc S/2001/42; ‘UNTAET Land Policy’ (2004) 2 East Timor Law Jour-
nal; <http://easttimorlawjournal.blogspot.com.au/2012/04/united-nations-transitional.html> 
accessed 23 February 2014.
91 ‘Guidelines for the Administration of  Public and Abandoned Property’ (2004) 11 East Timor Law Jour-
nal; <http://easttimorlawjournal.blogspot.com.au/2012/05/untaet-guidelines-for-administration-
of.html> accessed 20 March 2014.
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not affect the ownership claims that would be resolved by the elected government. 
This can be seen as an important element of  the reconstruction process, which 
suggests that the international administrators respected the right of  the Timorese 
people to economic self-determination by not adopting permanent measures on 
the matter. The local actors also played an important role in the decision-making 
processes by being able to approve economic policies and promulgate regulations 
that would affect their future.
The most significant legislative changes were therefore realised after 2002, the 
dissolution of  UNTAET allowing the new state to organise its economy and allo-
cation of  property rights. From 1999 to 2004, Timor-Leste remained without any 
comprehensive legislation to regulate investments and commercial transactions. 
Even though the state was not party to any BITs at that time, the government 
was bound by customary international rules. The measures that were adopted 
subsequently were typical of  those required by a country that is opening its econ-
omy, one of  which being the protection of  foreign investments in accordance with 
international law. In 2004 and 2005, three important laws passed: the Law on 
Commercial Companies (Law 4/2004), the Law on Domestic Investment Law 
(Law 4/2005) and the Law on External Investment (Law 5/2005).
The Law on External Investment and the Private Investment Law (Law 
14/2011), for instance, set out a legal framework conducive toward foreign invest-
ment and compliance with international legal standards. At the same time, these 
laws define an important role for the state to regulate investments to promote 
national development goals and the provision of  socioeconomic welfare. Foreign 
and national investors are guaranteed equal treatment and the latter may freely 
repatriate their profits. They may also employ foreign workers but external inves-
tors are under the obligation to employ Timorese nationals and advance their 
vocational training and technical skills.
In light of  these changes, the legislative framework that was adopted during 
the period of  international administration and after its dissolution suggests two 
main things. First, there was an effective effort by UNTAET to involve Timorese 
nationals in decision-making procedures and in drafting both the constitution 
and economic regulations. Second, the fact that the constitutional identity of  
the country and the content of  the economic reforms were influenced by the 
involvement of  UNTAET, the WB and the IMF does not imply that economic 
self-determination was breached. The reason for this proposition is that between 
1999 and 2002 there was no state structure in place or elected authorities that 
could represent the will of  the people and exercise their rights. Instead, the inter-
national administration promoted the exercise of  self-determination in a legal 
and institutional framework that incorporated and represented both the local cir-
cumstances and the norms and standards of  the international community. That 
said, both interpretations of  economic self-determination identified above oper-
ated during the transitional period: the participation of  Timorese nationals, as a 
measure of  the international society to ascertain their wishes, and the transition 
from subsistence economy to open market, as a requirement of  the international 
community.
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After 2002 and the election of  the Timorese government, the choice of  the local 
actors was to continue with the economic and legislative measures that imple-
mented a market-oriented economy. They relied, for example, on the loans and 
proposed reforms of  the WB and the IMF and applied to ASEAN for accession. 
At that point in time, Timor-Leste was a sovereign state with a government that 
was able to negotiate or even reject additional financial and structural assistance 
from international actors. Instead, the decision of  local actors was to further their 
integration into the regional and international economy. This choice can be con-
sidered, therefore, as a post facto legitimating factor of  the reconstruction policies 
pursued by UNTAET, as the elected government could have opted for a change in 
its course after 2002 and replace any measures that had been set up so far. Within 
the framework of  transition from subsistence to market economy, the local actors 
in Timor-Leste were able to negotiate important aspects of  their legal system that 
would determine their socioeconomic organisation, such as the provisions of  their 
national constitution and the laws on property rights and investments. It is within 
the parameters of  a market economy, therefore, that the Timorese people decided 
to exercise their right to economic self-determination during and after the inter-
national administration.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the right to economic self-determination in international society 
and during the period of  decolonisation was silent on the economic organisa-
tion that states adopted and accommodated the establishment of  a closed econ-
omy without external interference. This framework, however, is not adequate to 
describe the impact of  post-conflict operations on our understanding of  the right 
after the 1990s. Post-conflict reconstruction is a policy which reforms and vali-
dates the legal system and domestic governance of  the state by international stan-
dards. In the transitional processes whereby the territory negotiates the measures 
to restore its governability and become associated with the international com-
munity, it finds itself  influenced by international norms and rules, which generate 
substantive outcomes.
The right in this context is wider than in the international society, in that it con-
cerns the economic governance of  the territory and does not insulate the domestic 
from the international. The international community rather becomes also a stake-
holder in the process that restores international peace and security and provides 
the mechanisms of  reform reflecting its own policy and legal expectations. The 
outcome of  self-determination in the post-conflict context then is to re-invent the 
‘self ’ within the standards and rules of  the embedding external order.
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